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Whereas modern communication strategies have been celebrated for promoting ease of 
interaction, this chapter highlights that they have been deployed by some terrorist groups in Africa 
to threaten human security. It defines religious extremism in terms of the expression of extreme or 
violent actions or jihad on the basis of particular interpretations or understanding of religious 
teaching or scripture, especially the Quran. The chapter examines the (online) communication 
behaviours of extremists/terrorist groups in West Africa and Somalia that are often associated with 
Islam. It also examines religious extremism and its relation to violent conflict and describes the 
extremist violent activities of some identified African terrorist groups, and how contemporary 
media and the Internet have provided dynamic platforms for disseminating their message and 
ideology. Liebman views religious extremism as the desire to expand the scope, details and 
strictness of religious law, social isolation and the rejection of the surrounding culture. 
 
Introduction 
Extremism is often associated with religion and has in recent years been used exclusively in the 
context of religion due to the activities of religious extremists and terrorists who explain their 
actions as an expression of religious obligation. Some scholars have argued that certain unique 
features of religion make it susceptible to violent conflicts. For example, religion forms the basis 
for group identity and induces solidarity among people through its norms, values and practices: 
these make them feel socially and ideologically different from non-members of the group (See 
Enchill, 2014). Fox and Sandler (2005) further argue that religious doctrines and belief systems 
have the potential to generate conflicts, because of certain interpretation and understanding of 
doctrines, which form the basis for religious beliefs. Another significant role of religion in the 
generation of security challenges is its incorporation of emotionally evocative and highly 
memorable symbols, myths and rituals that can motivate members individually and collectively 
and form the basis for violent actions and for justification of such actions (Enchill, 2014).  
However, it is possible that religion may be used as camouflage for ethnic or political motives 
(Hexham, 2002). Hence, Møller (2006) does not see any significant connection between conflict 
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and religion, even with the high probability of Islamic states being prone to conflict or terrorism. 
In other words, the predominance of one brand of religion over another does not predestine a 
state for conflict or determine the patterns of conflict (p.38).  
Religious extremism in this chapter is defined in terms of the expression of extreme or violent 
actions or jihad on the basis of particular interpretations or understanding of religious teaching or 
scripture, especially the Koran.  In particular, we examine the (online) communication behaviours 
of Islamic extremists/terrorist groups in West Africa and Somalia. And we focus on Boko Haram 
of Nigeria, Ansar dine, and The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) of Mali, 
and Al Shabaab of Somalia. An overview of these extremists under study is carried out below. 
 






Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, a Muslim cleric, in Maiduguri, 
(Northeastern Nigeria). “Boko Haram” is a nickname for Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-
Jihad, meaning “people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad.” 
They began armed uprising in June 2009 when they claimed that they were fighting corruption, 
but their main aim was to Islamize the entire northern states of Nigeria. The uprising was 
confronted by the Nigerian military, resulting in the death of over 700 people mostly the sect 
members including their founder (see Chiluwa and Adetunji, 2013). The death of Mohammed 
Yusuf escalated the violence in the north perpetrated by Boko Haram now led by Abubakar 
Shekau who was deputy to Yusuf. Their targets have been churches, drinking pubs, army 
barracks, police stations and government facilities and agencies (Chiluwa, 2015).  
 
According to the United States National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START), only Afghanistan’s Taliban are ahead of Nigeria’s Boko Haram on the list 
of global terror (Chiluwa, 2015). Hence, on the 13th of November, 2013, the United States 
Department of State announced the designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist 
Organisations (FTOs) (START November, 2013). Despite local and international efforts to arrest 
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the activities of this group, they have continued their violent assaults in Nigeria and neighboring 
West African States. The group is said to have split into three factions operating in Cameroon, 
Chad and Niger some possible links to some terrorist groups in North Africa (Onuah and Eboh, 
2011 cited in Chiluwa, 2015). 
 
BH wants Northern Nigeria to return to the rule of a Caliphate, as it was prior to the 
Amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914. Northern Nigeria, southern Niger and Cameroon were then 
under the rule of the Sokoto Caliphate between 1850 and 1960 (Adesoji, 2010; Pérouse de 
Montclos, 2014). This is similar to the goal of ISIS – to establish a Caliphate of all Muslims 
under one supreme leader. A caliphate is a traditional Muslim form of government, in which the 
leader (or “caliph”) is viewed as a political and religious successor to the Prophet Muhammad. 
Presently, the Islamic State’s caliphate is thought to include several cities across northern Iraq 
and Syria.  
In November, 2012, the BH leader, in a 39-minute video entitled: “glad tidings, o’ soldiers of 
Allah,” posted in a jihadist forum, praised jihadist movements across the world and in particular, 
labelled the United States, Britain, Israel and Nigeria as enemies of Islam. In a similar message, 
Shekau, on behalf of BH joined other terrorist groups in Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia to 
pledge their allegiance to ISIS on the 17th of March, 2015. In the message, he told Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi (known to his followers as “Ibrahim Caliph”): “we announce our allegiance to the 
Caliph... and will hear and obey in times of difficulty and prosperity…” According to Jim Muir, 
(a BBC news correspondent in Beirut), this alliance means that BH has become a global franchise 
(BBC, March 7, 2015).  Incidentally, BH has carried out series of attacks, some of which have 
been their “deadliest” in northern Nigeria since the Nigerian new government was sworn-in in 
May, 2015. According to Amnesty International, about 1600 people have been killed since June, 
2015 in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.  
However, in the last few months, the Nigerian government has successfully pushed back BH, 
restricting them to mere “soft targets,” and has rescued communities and thousands of people 
previously held hostage by the group (Vanguard, 27th September, 2015). Although, the Nigerian 
government claims to have defeated Boko Haram, the group has remained active in the north and 
still carries out intermittent attacks on Mosques, villages and markets.  Thus, BH remains a 
serious global threat.  
Interestingly, on January 2nd 2018, Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram’s leader appeared in a 
video amidst renewed series of attacks claiming responsibility for the attacks in Maiduguri, 
Gamboru and Gamboa (northern Nigeria) during the festive season. BH had attacked a convoy of 
Nigerian soldiers, and sent suicide bombers into crowded markets in towns across northeast 
Nigeria in December 2017. In a 31-minute video, Shekau, speaking in Hausa announced that the 
group was in “good health” and that the Nigerian troops cannot do anything against them. The 
message came a few days after the Jihadists killed 25 people about 20km from Maiduguri. Some 




on-loggers-rises). 50 people were killed, while many others were injured in November, 2017 
when a suicide bomber attacked a mosque in Mubi (Adamawa state). 
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/11/suicide-bomber-killed-60-injured-scores-adamawa/). 





Ansar Dine (i.e. defenders of the faith) is a paramilitary terrorist group based in Northern Mali. 
The group is led by Iyad Ag Ghaly – a former senior commander of a rebel military group in 
Mali in the 1990s; he had also served as a negotiator for the release of Westerners kidnapped by 
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Ansar Dine emerged after the military coup in Mali 
that ousted Amadou Toure in March, 2012.  Alongside the Tuaregs’ National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), they declared the independence of the “Islamic Republic of 
Azawad,” after capturing the northern towns of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. The alliance with 
MNLA broke up when Ansar Dine and MUJAO, (another Islamic terrorist group with links 
AQIM), resorted to implement Sharia laws in the new state; MNLA had wanted only a secular 
independent state. This resulted in a conflict between the armed groups and by July 2012, Ansar 
Dine had gained full control of northern Mali (See BBC, May 27, 2012). By the invitation of the 
Malian government, the French military, with a UN mandate and some African Union members 
began a military operation against the Islamist militants and by February 2013, the Islamists had 
been driven out and the Islamist-held territory was recaptured. The main objective of Ansar Dine 
is to impose the Sharia throughout Mali.  
 
Although based in Mali, Ansar Dine is said to be a transnational outfit; their leader Ag Ghaly was 
said to receive Salafist religious training from Pakistani missionaries in northern Mali in the 
1990s and later rekindle his Islamist views during his diplomatic service in Saudi Arabia years 
later. Ansar Dine is believed to be funded by Qatar with its membership drawn from Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Somalia, Afghanistan and Algeria (Lambert and Warner, 2012). Global in its outreach, 
the group brought its efforts online by releasing a propaganda video and establishing a presence 
in jihadist chat rooms.  
 
Ansar Dine has claimed responsibility for several attacks including suicide bombings in Mali and 
neighboring states. For instance, the group claimed responsibility for four different attacks in 
Mali in February, 2016. In Kidal, the suicide and rocket attack on a UN base left six people dead. 
The group claimed that the attack was carried out in retaliation to the German president’s visit to 
Mali when he promised to contribute soldiers to the fight against Islamic terrorists in Mali 
(Weiss, 2015). They had also detonated improvised explosives on three UN vehicles and claimed 
to target a UN camp in Kidal with rockets (Weiss, 2016). In 2015 the Ansar Dine leader released 
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an audio statement in which he threatened France and rejected any peace accord in Mali (Weiss, 
2016). The United States Department of State designated Ansar Dine as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) in March, 2013.  
 
 
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) 
The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA, or MUJAO in French) is a 
Salafist terrorist group that broke off from A-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2011. 
They formally announced their existence following the abduction of three humanitarian workers 
from a Saharan refugee camp in Tindouf on 23 October 
2011. (http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/movement-oneness-and-jihad-west-africa-
mujao) Although the group became an independent terrorist group with the aim of spreading 
Jihad in West Africa, especially areas not within the scope of the operation of AQIM, it 
continued to be affiliated to AQIM. They operated in southern Algeria and Northern Mali and 
collaborated with Ansar Dine and the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) to fight 
for and declare the independence of the Islamic Republic of Azawad in 2013. 
(https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/movement-unity-and-jihad-west-africa-mujao) 
MUJAO’s leaders were known to be drug traffickers in the Sahel and southern Algeria. One 
faction of the group merged with Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Al Mulathameen to form a new group 
called Al-Mourabitoun in 2013. The group claimed to espouse the ideologies of those of Osama 
bin Laden and Mullah Omar (the Taliban leader). However, they emphasize the ideologies of 
some West African Islamic historical leaders such as Cheikhou Amadou, Usman Dan Fodio and 
El Hadi Umar Tall. (See https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/movement-unity-and-jihad-
west-africa-mujao). According to Insidegov.com, MUJAO has been responsible for at least 33 
attacks in three countries (Mali, Niger and Algeria) resulting in 71 deaths.  
(http://terrorist-groups.insidegov.com/l/7448/Movement-For-Oneness-And-Jihad-In-West-
Africa).  In the Battle of Konna in January, 2013, MUJAO temporarily gained control 
of Konna but was driven out by the Malian army and its allied French armed forces. MUJAO was 




Al Shabaab (i.e. Mujahedeen Youth Movement) was founded in 2006 as a radical arm of the 
Union of Islamic Courts in Mogadishu and is estimated to control over 7000 fighters (Calamur 
2013; Chiluwa, 2015). Their leader Aden Hashi Ayro was killed in a US air strike in May, 2008 
and was replaced by Ahmed Abdi Godane (or Abu Zubayr) as their top commander (Ungerleider 
2013). Al Shabaab, which is an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, operates from the Southern and Central 
Somalia with a mission to create a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia. Members of Al 
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Shabaab are said to be drawn from different clans and regional sub-clans and their militant 
groups (Chiluwa, 2015). They also exert influences and recruit radicalized youths from elsewhere 
in the African sub-regions and had kidnapped and conscripted schoolchildren to fight in battles. 
According to Gentleman (2011), educated Westerners work for Al Shabaab and several Somali-
Americans have been suicide bombers.  
 
Al Shabaab has resisted and fought against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of 
Somalia and its allies, including the African Union Mission in Somalia peacekeepers, and non-
governmental aid organizations. The group is said to be more interested in their nationalistic 
battle against the TFG and hopes to regain control of Southern and Central regions of Somalia, 
which it had attacked and taken over in 2006 but was overthrown by the Somali Government 
with the help of Ethiopian forces. The in-fighting and military pressure from the Somali 
Government and its allies has continued to liberate key towns from Al Shabaab. However, the 
group had continued to threaten neighboring African countries and Western interests in Africa 
(Chiluwa, 2015). Al Shabaab had claimed responsibility for several bombing attacks including 
suicide bombings in Mogadishu and in central and northern Somalia. The attacks had targeted 
Somali Government officials and their allies. Al Shabaab also claimed responsibility for the twin 
suicide bombings in Kampala (Uganda) on 11 July 2010 that killed over 70 people who gathered 
to watch the World Cup.  
 
In August 2014, the Somali government led a military operation known as “Operation Indian 
Ocean” to recapture some insurgent-held territories in the countryside. And on September 1, 
2014, a U.S. drone strike killed the Al-Shabaab leader (Ahmed Abdi Godane), and the Somali 
government offered a 45-day amnesty to all moderate members of the group (Associated Press, 
September 5, 2014). However, the militant group has remained very active and has been 
responsible for several deadly attacks. An example of their recent activity was the December 
2017 Mogadishu Market bombing that killed 500 people and injured many more. This was 
viewed as one of the most deadliest single terrorist attacks since 9/11. Al Shabaab also claimed 
responsibility for the Mogadishu hotel attacked in which 23 people were killed. 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/al-shabaab).  On the 29th of September 2017, the group 
attacked an army base killing eight soldiers and looting the place (Aljazeera, September 29, 
2017). These were among several other deadly attacks. The US Department of State designated 
this group as a foreign terrorist organization in 2008 (See http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-
shabaab/p18650). 
 
Religious Extremism in West Africa 
Africa is known as a religious continent with peoples of extreme spirituality that cut across three 
predominant religious families – traditional religion, Islam and Christianity, each of which is 
present in large numbers. As highlighted above, religious extremism has been used to describe 
any faith-induced action that is a deliberate attempt to inflict harm on others. Liebman (1983) 
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views religious extremism as the desire to expand the scope, details and strictness of religious 
law; social isolation; and the rejection of the surrounding culture. It includes the formation of 
violent religious movements, and the expression of extreme and unjust positions or actions in the 
name of a religious faith. Based on some controversial interpretations of religious doctrines, 
extremists are usually willing to murder anyone against their faith by embracing ideologies that 
consent to violence in the service of God. Non-members of their faith are generally viewed as 
infidels and as enemies of God. Significantly, extremists are also ready to sacrifice their own 
lives in the name of martyrdom.  
As is common with all Islamic extremists, terrorist groups in Africa reject alternative views and 
seek to impose their beliefs, ideologies and values on non-adherents through force or 
indoctrination and are intolerant of beliefs and perspectives of other religions. Boko Haram for 
instance reject Western education and social lifestyle, and have carried out attacks on churches, 
schools, beer halls and pubs. They have also attacked Mosques and moderate Muslims accused of 
compromising Islamic teachings. They reject the Nigerian democratic government and insist on 
the creation of an independent Islamic State in Northern Nigeria strictly governed by Sharia laws. 
Members congregate in mosques, wear long gowns and grow longs beards (Chiluwa & Adetunji, 
2013).  
Like Boko Haram, Al Shabaab of Somalia enforce a harsh interpretation of the Sharia and also 
prohibit Western lifestyle and entertainment. Hence, they condemn Western education, music, 
movies, haircuts, etc. They also attack non-Muslims, including Christians and are a major threat 
to humanitarian and other international workers (Chiluwa, 2015). For instance, the group was 
said to be responsible for the assassination of Somali peace activists, international aid workers, 
journalists and numerous civil society personnel, and was blamed for blocking the delivery of aid 
from some Western relief agencies during the 2011 famine that killed thousands of Somalis 
(Masters, 2013 cited in Chiluwa, 2015). 
 
Extremists generally set up a binary “them and us” world view, with the intention of dividing 
communities along communal lines, and enforcing this through violence. They also inhibit the 
civil liberty and human rights of others on the basis of gender, sexuality and race. Very often 
however, some adherents of such religions consider violent positions as fanatical, unacceptable 
and unrepresentative of their faith, just as some moderate Muslims have often denounced and 
dissociated themselves from the extreme positions of Islamic militants and terrorists.  
 
Communication Techniques by Extremist and Terrorist Groups 
Terrorist groups across the world are constantly developing methods and techniques in their 
modes of operations, some which include sophisticated systems of technological communication. 
The continual success of several well-planned attacks around the world is a clear proof that 
terrorist organizations have perfected their communication methods. In recent times, the Internet 
has provided Islamic extremists with variety of resources targeted at young people, and 
8 
 
connecting them with online Islamist recruiters. According to Awan (2017), ISIS for example, 
has developed an app to spread their propaganda through images and the streaming of violent 
online videos. Some of their websites and videos are specifically targeted at youth audiences, 
disseminating extremist doctrines and propaganda through colorful cartoons and games. In 
Africa, the Boko Haram of Nigeria and the Al-Shabaab of Somalia have consistently used the 
Internet to wage a cyber-war. Al Shabaab for instance, has been accused of “twitter terrorism”, 
and hate-speech warranting the shutting down of their Twitter accounts at different times 
(Gentleman, 2011, p. 2; Chiluwa, 2013). 
Before the prevalence of information technology and the adoption of the Internet for terrorist 
propaganda and operations, Al-Qaeda communicated with its member and allies (e.g. in Turkey) 
through face-to-face communication, courier services, telephone, the mass media and the 
Internet. They claimed responsibility for attacks and issue political statements in the mass media. 
Through personal contacts at members or supporters’ homes or at a specified location, they were 
also able to transmit information faster and easier. Communication by courier was transmitted 
through persons who delivered packages and mail to their destinations. Courier people were 
usually members of the organization who delivered secret notes and instructions, as well as 
money, and other items, including weapons to designated places (Pekgozlu, Ozdemir and Ercikti, 
2007). Up till the present times, terrorist groups and secessionist movements still communicate 
through the mass media. Boko Haram of Nigeria and the Ansar Dine of Mali still issue threats 
and make “statements” and “declarations” as well as publish “press releases” in the mass media 
and the Internet. The example below is an excerpt from one of Boko Haram’s statements 
published in the Vanguard newspaper (August 9, 2009). 
“For the first time since the killing of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, our leader, we 
hereby make the following statements: That we have started a Jihad in Nigeria which 
no force on earth can stop…That from the Month of August, we shall carry out series 
of bombing in Southern and Northern Nigerian cities, beginning with Lagos, Ibadan, 
Enugu and Port Harcourt…” That we shall make the country ungovernable, kill and 
eliminate irresponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those who 
oppose the rule of Sharia in Nigeria and ensure that the infidel does not go 
unpunished…That very soon, we shall stir Lagos, the evil city and Nigeria’s South 
West and South East, in a way no one has ever done before. Al Hakubarah…” 
(Chiluwa, 2017, p.331). 
 
According to Bogart (2013), Al-Qaeda like other terrorist groups, is known for using 
religious terms, along with code-words usually referred to as “veil speech” in their 
communication exchanges in order to dupe persons and authorities. This form of “language 
protection” is a commonly used tactic by extremist groups; for example, writing emails 
and website literature in Arabic, or other dialogues that may be harder to translate. Jihadist 
websites also disguise text in Arabic, along with using URLs that change constantly and 
are often password-protected, making it difficult for Westerners to track (p.1).  
The prominence of Internet communications in contemporary social life and the application of 
the Internet and ICT to advance terrorist activities have given rise to the concept of “Terrorism 
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2.0”, where terrorist groups have extensively adopted web 2.0 applications and semantic 
technology tools to propagate their activities (Ishengoma, 2013). This is especially made possible 
by the existence of the Dark Web and the Deep Web; that is, a body of cryptic websites and 
online data that are not publicly available on popular search engines, yet allow for 
communication and dissemination of information without being detected or tracked by 
governments and intelligence agencies (Harsh, 2015). The Dark Web is encrypted with tools such 
as TOR (The Onion Router) and I2P. There is also the e-commerce site – “The Armory” in the 
Dark Web; where terrorist organizations easily transact in weaponry (arms and ammunition, 
explosive devices, etc.) through crypto-currencies such as the BitCoin (Harsh, 2015). 
Terrorist groups also use other forms of encrypted communication, within the Deep Web in 
recruiting and radicalizing members, as well as planning attacks. This communication takes place 
via private messaging applications such as WhatsApp, Snapchat, and iMessage where messages 
are not only encrypted, but can also be easily deleted without leaving a trace. They also encrypt 
their messages in public online platforms such as eBay (an online market) and Reddit boards. 
When encryption is not entirely possible, the Chaffing and Winnowing technique is used, where 
secret messages are subliminally inserted in a mix of seemingly regular messages (Harsh, 2015). 
Social media pages and accounts run by the different terrorist organizations, further provide 
platforms to propagate their messages and ideologies, and attempt to indoctrinate or radicalize 
other Internet users. They also plan and carry out attacks, and raise funds through some complex 
digital platforms (Bott, Dickens, Moffitt, Rowley, Smith, & Thompson, 2009; Ishengoma, 2013).  
According to Conway (2017) “today’s Internet does not simply allow for the dissemination and 
consumption of “extremist material” in a one-way broadcast from producer to consumer, but also 
high levels of online social interaction around this material” (p. 80). There are models developed 
to describe the recruitment process in radicalization, and evidently, this is largely done online. 
The Berger’s model, for instance, notes that terrorist recruiters usually use Twitter and Facebook 
to identify target recruits, develop personal friendship/relationship with them and sustain 
communication while consciously radicalizing them (Operation250). In the process, these 
recruiters build micro-communities around the recruit, as the main recruiter engineers seemingly 
random connections between other terrorists and the recruit. In the process, isolation takes place, 
and the recruit gradually replaces his/her former real-life friends with the new ones made online. 
These are geared towards ensuring that the recruit learns the group’s ideology, as well as test the 
recruit’s tendency to take orders. Eventually, the recruiters interact with their recruits on private 
or encrypted messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram. The radicalization cycle is 
completed once it is ascertained that the recruit will either remain at his or her location to plan 
attacks or travel out of their country to join the terrorist group. This recruit then sets out to 
radicalize others.  
Bertram and Ellison (2014) report that terrorist groups in Sub-Saharan Africa first gained online 
presence in 2008. At the time of their study, 112 websites were traceable to Sub-Saharan African 
terrorist groups, and a significant fraction of these groups have visible web presence. South 
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Africa and Nigeria had the highest number of these websites. The Somalia-based Al-Shabaab for 
instance, disseminated information about the deadly Westgate terrorist attack, as well as claim 
responsibility for the attack on Twitter. Below are a few examples from their English language 
Twitter account:  
MSM Press Office @HSM_PR 
The Mujahideen entered #Westgate Mall today at around noon and are 
still inside the mall, fighting the #Kenyan Kuffar inside their own turf. 
 
MSM Press Office @HSM_PR 
The attack at Westgate Mall is just a very tiny fraction of what Muslims 






The Mujahideen strive to liberate Muslim lands & lift the oppression 
from Muslims who are forced to live under the heel of Kafir Invasion 
(Chiluwa, 2015, p9-10). 
 
Boko Haram, also constantly makes attempts to define the tone of public rhetoric about them, and 
make it a duty to respond to public rumours, especially those propagated by their perceived 
enemies (Mahmood, 2017). As highlighted above, the group’s public discourse in the past was 
initiated by press statements or interviews, granted by appointed spokespersons to local 
journalists; however, they have quickly moved from traditional means of public discourse to the 
more trendy, resourceful and spontaneous affordances of Internet technologies. In fact, the 
Internet has become almost the exclusive means of public communication used by the group 
(Mahmood, 2017). 
The group had previously operated Twitter accounts, namely @BokoHaram (Chadian Border) 
and @BokoHaram (Republic of Arewa), for the propagation of their ideologies, and advancement 
of their objectives (Chiluwa & Adetunji, 2013; Chiluwa & Ajiboye, 2014). Below are examples 
from their English language Twitter account:  
@Boko_Haram. We love Nigerians; it’s only the Nigerian polis, Nigerian 
army, drunkards, prostitutes, politicians, usurers, teachers, touts we can’t stand.  
@Boko_Haram. Armypeople you are hungry, polis you are tired. Go home. 
We are your friends. Our enemies are the infidels at Aso Rock #gaskiya.  
@Boko_Haram. Jonathan, abati, omokri are a threat to Nigeria not Boko 
Haram. We fight for your liberation even though you are not grateful 
#longterm.  
@Boko_Haram. MEND is after money, we are after ideals. Ideas that come at 




In recent times, Boko employ high resolution YouTube videos as one of their main outlets for 
information dissemination to address government at various levels, the media, and the Nigerian 
people, among others. Through their YouTube channel, they offer coverage of attacks, make 
verbal threats of potential attacks, and make bold statements on the success of planned attacks, as 
well as take responsibility for attacks. Since 2015, the group has embraced a more global 
outreach by broadcasting mostly in Arabic (almost 90% of messages), rather than Fulfude and 
Kanuri, which have more localized audiences (Mahmood, 2017). These videos are distributed 
across various social networking sites, earning the group its desired publicity. 
There are also reports that many of the attacks carried out by Boko Haram are co-ordinated by 
mobile telephony (Jacob & Akpan, 2015). This, had in 2013, necessitated the shutdown of mobile 





This chapter has examined religious extremism and its relation to violent conflict. It has 
specifically described the extremist violent activities of some identified African terrorist groups, 
and how contemporary media and the Internet have provided dynamic platforms for 
disseminating their message and ideology. Unfortunately, despite government and allied 
confrontations of these terrorist groups, and the claims that they have been defeated, the Islamist 
militants are rather expanding and are still carrying out deadly attacks. And interestingly, the 
media and Information technology, including the Internet support the communication options that 
promote disseminating of extremist ideas, as well as propaganda, recruitment and mobilizing, 
incitement, radicalization and fund-raising (see Chiluwa, 2017). The question here is: how can 
religious extremists or terrorist groups be restricted from using the Internet, for example? 
Conway (2005) has suggested that just as there is information available for terrorist groups on 
how to disseminate their doctrines and move money, and recruits around the world, there are also 
data that can trail them and check their activities. She notes that law enforcement agencies have 
been the main instigators of these initiatives and have been joined by other government agencies 
and concerned individuals and hacktivists. She suggests intelligence gathering, especially from 
open sources and innovative ideas on intelligence sourcing; new technologies to be developed 
and deployed in the fight against terrorism, and sanitizing government sites. The latter means, 
avoiding providing information that might be useful to terrorists in planning further attacks. For 
instance, after 9/11 some state and private web page operators took large amounts of material off 
the Internet (Conway, 2005). 
Some have suggested that government should simply block terrorist websites, which some 
governments have already done. But others feel this measure may be complicated and have their 
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legal implications. Rather, they suggest “filtering” of such websites like the German government 
has done in passing a law to protect children from pornography and could be extended to block 
sites that promote terrorist acts. Australia was said to be testing a filtering system for both child 
pornography and materials that advocate terrorism (Mantel, 2009). 
In West Africa unfortunately, there appears to be no form of legislation or initiative that aims at 
studying the activities of extremist and terrorist in the media and the Internet. We suggest that 
African nations, especially countries that are prone to or host terrorist activities like Nigeria, Mali 
and Somalia should threaten their counter-intelligence and terrorist intelligence services. We 
advocate strong initiatives and legislation that aim at censoring or prohibiting terrorist behaviours 
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